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that reaches back to the nineteenth-century French libertarian socialist Pierre-
Joseph Proudhon (see Dillard, 1942b; Darity, 1995). Both Gesell and Keynes 
opposed nationalization of industry and central planning (although Gesell did 
advocate nationalization of land in conjunction with stamped currency to 
prevent a flight to land as an alternative to a flight to money). Both were 
dissatisfied with capitalism on grounds of maldistribution of income and the 
waste of unemployment, and both rejected 'communism' as an alternative on 
grounds of destruction of individual liberties; Gesell and Keynes were cham-
pions of the 'middle way'. Both sought to reconcile individualism with the 
need for state action to maintain economic prosperity. And both saw the 
extension of prosperity - rather than social revolution - as the best avenue 
towards the end of capitalism and its attendant social ills. 
WILLIAM D ARITY, JR. 
See also: 
Liquidity Trap; Monetary Policy; Money; Real Balance Effect. 
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Government Investment Programs (the Socialization of 
Investment) 
In the last chapter of The GeneraL Theory Keynes said that the 'outstanding 
fault of the economic society in which we live are its failure to provide for 
full employment and its arbitrary and inequitable distribution of wealth and 
incomes' (Keynes, 1936, p. 372). These problems were linked by the classi-
cal theory of the rate of interest that justified high interest rates as needed to 
generate savings for investment: high interest rates contributed to significant 
inequalities in fortunes accumulated by the rentier class and reduced invest-
ment below full employment levels. However, were interest rates low, it 
would be possible ' to increase the stock of capital up to a point where its 
Government Investment Programs 211 
marginal efficiency had fallen to a very low figure' , so that 'capital instru-
ments would cost almost nothing' (ibid., p. 375). Depriving capital of its 
scarcity value 'would mean the euthanasia of the rentier' or 'functionless 
investor' (ibid.) and would also imply a responsibility for the state to formu-
late policy regarding what inducements to investment and influence upon the 
propensity to consume were necessary to achieve a rate of accumulation 
sufficient for full employment. Keynes adds, 
it seems unlikely that the influence of banking policy on the rate of interest will be 
sufficient by itself to determine the optimum rate of investment. I conceive, 
therefore, that a somewhat comprehensive socialisation of investment will prove 
the only means of securing an approximation to full employment. (Ibid., p. 378). 
This involved neither 'state socialism' nor state ownership of the means of 
production. Indeed , 'apart from the necessity of central controls to bring 
about an adjustment between the propensity to consume and the inducement 
to invest, there is no more reason to socialise economic life than there was 
before' (ibid., p . 379) - efficiency, freedom and private initiative being the 
likely casualties of attempting to do so. 
Keynes's long-term economic policy thus focused on the state 'taking an 
ever greater responsibility for directly organising investment' (ibid., p. 164). 
In his wartime Treasury memoranda of 1943-4 concerning postwar economic 
adjustment he was more specific about the extent of this responsibility : 
If two-thirds or three-quarters of total investment is carried out or can be influ-
enced by public or semi-public bodies, a long-term programme of a stable character 
should be capable of reducing the potential range of fluctuation to much narrower 
limits than formerly, when a smaller volume of investment was under public 
control and when even this part tended to follow, rather than correct, fluctuations 
of investment in the strict ly private sector of the economy. (1973-89, XXVII, 
p.322) 
Thus Keynes allowed that the state could carry out programs of public invest-
ment itself, and/or encourage such programs being developed by organizations 
independent of the state but which still pos.sessed some public character. 
There are two ways in which he apparently understood the latter, both deriv-
ing from views Keynes expressed much earlier in 'The End of Laissez-Faire' 
(1926). 
On the one hand, Keynes emphasized the importance of a variety of 'semi-
autonomous bodies within the state': 
I believe that in many cases the ideal size for the unit of control and organisation 
lies somewhere between the individual and modern state. I suggest, therefore, that 
progress lies in the growth and recognition of semi-autonomous bodies within the 
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State - bodies whose criterion of action within their own field is solely the public 
good as they understand it, and from whose deliberations motives of private 
advantage are excluded. (1973-89, IX, p. 288). 
As examples Keynes cited ' the universities, the Bank of England, the Port of 
London Authority, even perhaps the railways companies ' , and suggested that 
these institutions were rooted in an ancient English tradition that regarded 
such bodies as 'a mode of government' (ibid., p. 289). On this view, then, 
' semi-public bodies' were public-spirited in concerning themselves with the 
public good (rather than shareholder interests), but still not part of the state 
proper. They might be thought part of an extended state, as compared to the 
nuclear state made up of Parliament, the Cabinet, the civil service and the 
judiciary (Jensen, 1994). 
On the other hand, Keynes also though that 'joint stock institutions' , which 
had traditionally made shareholder interests primary.-tended to undergo an 
evolution in nature when they increased in size over time: 
when they have reached a certain age and size, [they 1 approximate to the status of 
public corporations rather than that of individualistic enterprise. One of the most 
interesting and unnoticed developments of recent decades has been the tendency 
of big enterprise to socialise itself. A point arrives in the growth of a big institu-
tion ... at which the owners of the capital, i.e. the shareholders, are almost entirely 
dissociated from the management, with the result that the direct personal interest 
of the latter in the making of great profit becomes quite secondary. When this 
stage is reached, the general stability and reputation of the institution are more 
considered by the management than the maximum of profit for the shareholders. 
(Keynes, 1973-89,IX, p. 289) 
While such 'joint stock institutions' would still typically be involved in forms 
of production less public in character than that carried out by Keynes 's ' semi-
autonomous bodies within the [extended) State', the separation of management 
and ownership allowed for greater retained earnings and thus potentially 
higher levels of investment. The state might then well anticipate some suc-
cess in designing inducements to investment for organizations of this sort, as 
compared to the more traditional owner-managed firms that predominated in 
the nineteenth century. 
Given these different strategies for carrying out and/or influencing invest-
ment, a further issue for Keynes was how the state might coordinate and 
guide investment across its own agencies, the ' semi-autonomous bodies with 
the [extended) State ' and manager-operated 'joint stock institutions' . In 1939, 
he wrote that 'we need, if we are to enjoy prosperity and profits, .. . much 
more central planning than we have at present ' (1973-89, XXI, p. 492) and 
recommended creating a National Investment Board to assist in this purpose. 
Keynes, however, did not indicate clearly what proportions of public invest-
Government Investment Programs 213 
ment, semi-public investment and private investment he thought might be 
desirable. Presumably the point of having a National Investment Board was 
to determine what these shares ought to be on the basis of economic condi-
tions. 
An important philosophical theme in Keynes's thinking on these matters 
concerns the ethical goals underlying policy recommendation. Keynes was 
critical of utilitarian thinking from the time when he studied G.E. Moore 's 
ethics as an undergraduate, and in a number of his early Apostles papers he 
discussed the ethical conflict between the goals of being good and doing 
good. In his post-General Theory 'My Early Beliefs ' memoir, however, he 
defended rules and conventions - 'the extraordinary accomplishment of our 
predecessors in the ordering of life ' (1973-89, X, p. 448) - as normatively 
valuable, because they helped individuals reconcile being good and doing 
good. Rules and conventions, moreover, were embodied in institutions in 
Keynes's view, and long-term economic policy could not but be concerned 
with the development of institutions (Davis, 1994). Thus we may infer that 
Keynes supported a socialization of investment, not just because he thought it 
would lead to higher levels of employment and reduce inequitable distribu-
tions of income and wealth, but also because he expected it would enable 
individuals increasingly to reconcile the twin moral requirements of being 
good and doing good. This theme is most prominent in his references to 
pUblic-spiritedness in the 'semi-autonomous bodies within the [extended) 
State' and to the socializing of big enterprise. Essentially Keynes sought a 
closer blending of private and public purpose - a closer connection between 
being good and doing good, which should also be thought part and parcel of 
Keynes's liberal vision. Neither a state-commanded economy nor one driven 
by narrow self-interest was healthy either economically or ethically. 
The socialization of investment summarized for Keynes a range of long-
term policies meant to improve the functioning of the economy and raise the 
well-being of individuals in society generally. A first step involved the 
'euthanasia of the rentier', and thus a shift in the balance of class power. A 
second step involved programs to enhance investment, including public in-
vestment, inducements for private investment . and institutional change that 
would have an impact on investment decision-making practices. A third step 
involved embracing a new moral vision meant to overcome old dualisms 
produced by the historic shift from entrepreneurship to speculation. ckner-
ally these strategies and their rationales have been overlooked by economists 
since Keynes, who have restricted their understanding of his policy thinking 
to short-term policy issues. Keynes likely thought short-term policy operated 
within a long-term policy framework, and thus himself evaluated short-term 
proposals from this broader perspective. 
JOHN B. DAVIS 
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